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Abstract: As non-state actors, PMSCs are not embraced by traditional state-dominated 
doctrines of international law. However, international law has itself failed to keep pace with 
the evolution of states and state-based actors, to which strong Westphalian notions of 
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sovereignty are no longer applicable. It is argued that these structural inadequacies stand in 
the way of international regulation of PMSCs, rather than defects in international human 
rights and humanitarian law per se. By analyzing understandings of legal responsibility, 
where such structural issues come to the fore, it is argued that, rather than attempting to 
resolve the essentially ideological dispute about the inherent functions of a state, regulatory 
regimes should focus on the positive obligations of states and PMSCs, and the interactions 
between them. Applying the results of this analysis, current and proposed regulatory regimes 
are evaluated and their shortcomings revealed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This article puts forward an analysis of two main international legal approaches that are 
emerging as part of an effort to regulate the activities of Private Military and Security 
Companies (PMSCs). PMSCs are non-state actors that have an increasing role and impact on 
conflict and post-conflict zones around the globe. One approach, the Montreux Process, is 
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based on non-binding (soft law) international instruments:
1
 the Montreux Document of 2008 
applicable to participating states,
2
 and the International Code of Conduct of 2010 applicable 
to PMSCs.
3
 The second approach is based on the development of a hard (binding) law 
regime that would, if in force, be applicable to states and international organizations. This 
type of hard law is exemplified in the UN Working Group on Mercenaries‘ Draft Convention 
put before the Human Rights Council in 2010.
4
 These regulatory initiatives are considered 
through the lens of the law of responsibility, an area of international law concerned with the 
―incidence and consequences of illegal acts, and particularly the payment of compensation‖ 
and other remedies for loss caused.
5
  
Traditionally, international law has been concerned with legal responsibility for the 
internationally wrongful acts or omissions of states - the traditional actors in international 
relations. This article examines the responsibility of states, for example when they contract 
with PMSCs, but it also covers institutional, as well as corporate responsibility, for acts or 
omissions that violate international law. By covering these three actors - both state and 
non-state - the article investigates whether the Montreux Process (within which is included 
the International Code of Conduct), and the Draft Convention can work together in a 
complementary way as regards issues of responsibility and accountability. In so doing, it 
considers the law of state and institutional responsibility as developed by the UN‘s 
                                           
1
  This article follows the orthodox legal distinction between hard law as legally binding and soft law as not 
legally binding, though this author recognizes the more subtle analysis of the differences located in non-legal 
literature. See, for example, Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance,” International Organization 54 (2000): 421-56.  
2
  Montreux Document, UN Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636, October 6, 2008; (hereinafter “Montreux Document”). 
3
  International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 2010, 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Nam
es.pdf  (accessed February 3, 2012) (hereinafter “International Code of Conduct”). 
4
  In Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right to Self-Determination, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/25, July 2, 2010 (hereinafter 
“Draft Convention”). 
5
  Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 434. 
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International Law Commission (ILC), which, though not formulated in treaty form, is  
customary binding law or has the potential to become such. The article also considers the soft 
(non-binding) law of corporate social responsibility (CSR), particularly as developed by John 
Ruggie, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
6
 Although customary 
and treaty law binds international legal persons - states and intergovernmental organizations - 
norms of CSR operate at the level of non-binding soft law directed at entities such as PMSCs 
that do not have international legal personality.  
A note of caution: this article does not try to find unity where there is none. The 
author is well aware of the divisions that exist between those supporters of the Montreux 
Process and those of the Draft Convention,
7
 but this does not necessarily mean that the 
outcomes of these two processes should automatically be in conflict with one another.
8
 
The focus of the analysis will not be so much on mechanisms of accountability, 
though they will be mentioned, but on the issue of where legal responsibilities lie. 
Furthermore, rather than analyzing the criminal responsibility of an individual working for a 
PMSC, this article considers which entities are jointly or severally responsible for that wrong. 
Those in the frame for the purposes of this article are: the company or corporate actor itself, 
the state or organization that contracted with the PMSC, the state in which the PMSC is 
registered, or the state in which it is working. Of course a complete review of all forms of 
                                           
6
  Last year, the Human Rights Council decided to establish a Working Group on this issue consisting of five 
independent experts.; Human Rights Council, Resolution 17/4, Human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises,; A/HRC/RES/17/4, July 6, 2011. 
7
  See the contribution by José L. Gomez Del Prado, in this issue. 
8
  Nigel D. White, “The Privatization of Military and Security Functions and Human Rights: Comments on the 
UN Working Group’s Draft Convention,” Human Rights Law Review 11 (2001): 149-51. 
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responsibility would include possible individual criminal responsibility of contractors,
9
 but 
even robust and effective national and international mechanisms for determining individual 
criminal responsibility will not, by themselves, make up for the lack of accountability for 
violations of international law committed by those working for PMSCs. To build an 
accountability regime for PMSCs solely on the basis of individual criminal responsibility 
would be akin to relying on courts martial or criminal trials to address the responsibilities of 
the U.S. and the UK for prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib and Basra during the military 
operations in Iraq, following the invasion of that country in March 2003. In the case of the 
UK, the conviction of one soldier for war crimes in relation to the death of Baha Mousa in a 
British detention center in Basra was clearly inadequate to address the responsibility of the 
army and, ultimately, of the UK, for prisoner abuse.
10
 Such inadequacy is evidenced by the 
need for a public inquiry,
11
 and by the proceedings against the UK before English courts for 
violation of the right to life, and then before the European Court of Human Rights.
12
 
Compensation has also been paid by the UK government,
13
 and further criminal prosecutions 
may follow from the findings of the public inquiry.  
Ethically speaking, though individual criminal responsibility can go towards 
satisfying the needs for retribution as well as deterrence, it fails to address fully the range of 
moral as well as legal responsibilities that arise from breaches of international law. For these 
reasons the iconic statement of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946 – ―crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
                                           
9
  See the contributions by Katherine Huskey and Marcus Hedahl, in this issue.  
10
  Gerry Simpson, “The Death of Baha Mousa,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 8 (2007): 340. 
11
  Sir William Gage, “The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry,” September 8, 2011, 
http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/report/index.htm (accessed February 3, 2012). 
12
  Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (app. no. 55721/07), July 7, 2011. 
13
  Matthew Weaver and Richard Norton-Taylor, “MoD to Pay £3m to Iraqis Tortured by British Troops,” The 
Guardian, July 10, 2008. 
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individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced‖,14 
oversimplifies, as Andre Nollkaemper argues, ―the relationship between individual and 
state.‖15 As regards the actions of individuals like Adolf Eichmann in Nazi Germany, such 
crimes occurred, and could only occur according to Hannah Arendt, within a ―criminal 
state‖;16 in other words both individual and state bear responsibility for the sort of systematic 
and egregious crimes committed. The same analysis is applicable to human rights violations, 
and is reflected in the fact that human rights are embodied and protected in international law 
and are not necessarily guaranteed in the national legal systems of all states. Given that states 
(and international organizations) are committed to protect and uphold human rights at the 
international level, they must bear responsibility in international law when they are violated. 
Furthermore, as Nollkaemper notes, the ―remedies for state responsibility and for individual 
responsibility are different,‖ with the latter involving the punishment of individuals and the 
former involving reparations, though there can be overlaps between the two.
17
  
In order to address the responsibilities of states, organizations, and corporations (in 
the form of PMSCs) this article initially considers how international law defines and delimits 
their responsibilities. In so doing, it highlights the substantive weaknesses of international 
law in attributing the wrongful acts of private actors to either the states or organizations 
employing them or otherwise having interaction with them. Furthermore, it highlights the 
structural weaknesses of international law in not imposing obligations directly on PMSCs as 
non-state actors. Given these circumstances, the article turns to consider whether the 
                                           
14
  The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at 
Nuremberg, Germany (22
nd
 August, 1946 to 1
st
 October 1946), Part 22, at 447. 
15
  Andre Nollkaemper, “Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52 (2003): 624. 
16
  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 
240. 
17
  Nollkaemper, “Concurrence,” 636. 
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nebulous concept of due diligence, which applies in differing forms for the various actors, 
can provide a robust enough framework upon which accountability can be built. The article 
concludes by looking at whether the Montreux Process and the Draft Convention can work 
separately or together to develop responsibility and accountability of states, organizations, 
and PMSCs for internationally wrongful acts committed by PMSCs and their employees.  
 
 
2. The Responsibility Matrix 
 
Business corporations such as PMSCs, states, and international organizations are all, in a 
conceptual sense, corporate actors, relying on individuals to carry out their will, and so all 
raise problems in attaching responsibility. Certainly there is difficulty in attaching criminal 
responsibility to these entities. The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court covers 
neither corporations nor states, only ―natural persons.‖18 Although the notion of criminal 
responsibility is underdeveloped at the international level (apart from individual 
responsibility for certain core crimes), there are developed and developing rules on state and 
institutional responsibility. As international actors possessing international legal personality, 
states and intergovernmental organizations (formed by states) are responsible for wrongful 
acts committed by them or attributed to them. Unfortunately, when it comes to corporations, 
which are non-state actors established under national private law, international law does not 
generally recognizes their responsibility, at least not in the same sense as state or institutional 
                                           
18
  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Art. 25, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9. 
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responsibility.  
The UN‘s International Law Commission (ILC) has produced sets of articles on state 
and institutional responsibility (the latter still in draft form). Unfortunately they are rather 
abstract and reveal inconsistencies and differences of approach. States and organizations are 
very different - organizations have neither territory nor population over which they have 
jurisdiction, and furthermore do not possess a monopoly on the use of force and the capacity 
to enforce it by police and military means.
19
 This should signify that the rules as to when an 
organization is responsible should be different from those that apply to a state, but although 
there are differences between the two sets of articles (for example, on attribution of conduct), 
they do not fully reflect the differences between the two types of international legal persons. 
Setting aside these differences, the responsibility of states and organizations is conceptually 
of a different order from the notion of CSR that is being developed at both national and 
international levels. 
 
2.1 State Responsibility 
When considering the wrongful acts of PMSCs and the rules of state responsibility, the ILC‘s 
Articles on State Responsibility of 2001 indicate that the state is responsible for those 
wrongful acts in three possible separate circumstances. First, when PMSCs are incorporated 
into the armed forces, so becoming a part of a state organ (Article 4); second, if PMSCs were 
exercising elements of governmental authority (Article 5); or third, where, in the absence of 
                                           
19
  Nigel D. White, “Institutional Responsibility for Private Military and Security Companies,” in War by 
Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors, eds. Francesco Francioni and Natalino 
Ronzitti (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 392. 
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the first or second circumstances, PMSCs act under the instructions, direction, or control, of 
the state in carrying out that conduct (Article 8). The first two grounds are less likely to be 
applicable than the third - PMSCs are unlikely to be fully incorporated into the armed forces 
of a state since this would seem to negate the whole idea of outsourcing. Furthermore, there is 
an ideological dispute as to what are the inherent functions of a state. This dispute is revealed 
in the differences on permissible forms of outsourcing found between the Draft Convention 
and the Montreux Document. 
The premise underlying the approach contained in the Draft Convention is that there 
are inherently governmental or state functions that should not be delegated or outsourced.
20
 
This is based on a certain understanding of the role of the state, a view that might not be 
shared by all governments, especially those with the most aggressive approaches to 
privatization. It contrasts with the Montreux Document, which identifies only prohibitions on 
contracting states outsourcing activities that international humanitarian law assigns to states 
(such as exercising the power of the responsible officer over prisoners of war or internment 
camps).
21
 The Draft Convention defines inherent state functions broadly on the basis that 
they are ―consistent with the principle of State monopoly on the legitimate use of force,‖ and 
cannot be outsourced or delegated to non-state actors. These functions include ―direct 
participation in hostilities, waging war and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, 
law-making, espionage, intelligence, knowledge transfer with military, security and policing 
application, use of and other activities related to weapons of mass destruction and police 
powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention including the interrogation of 
                                           
20
  See the preamble to the Draft Convention, which expresses concern about the “increasing delegation or 
outsourcing of inherently State functions which undermine any State’s capacity to retain its monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force.” See also Art. 1(1) Draft Convention.  
21
  Montreux Document, Part IA, para. 2. 
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detainees.‖22  
Although the Montreux Document views PMSCs as civilians and frowns upon them 
directly participating in hostilities (though not directly prohibiting them from so doing),
23
 it 
assumes that all services, other than the ones assigned to states under international 
humanitarian law, can legitimately be performed by such actors. The Montreux Document 
states that ―military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and 
protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance 
and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local 
forces and security personnel.‖24 Thus there are clear problems in compatibility between the 
Montreux Document and the Draft Convention as regards combat roles and other functions 
performed by PMSCs away from the front-line including detention.  
The problems in determining the inherent functions of a state leave the ―control test‖ 
under Article 8 of ILC‘s Articles as the most relevant and applicable one for attribution of 
PMSC conduct to a state. This test is said to be a strict one (requiring effective control of the 
conduct in question), and reflects the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua case of 1986,
25
 and the Bosnia case of 2007. In the latter case, the International 
Court dismissed lesser forms of control by saying that a state is ―responsible only for its own 
conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf.‖26   
                                           
22
  Draft Convention, Art. 2(i). 
23
  Montreux Document, Part I, para. 25; Part II, paras. 1, 24, and 53. 
24
  Ibid., Preface, para. 9. The International Code of Conduct adopts a similar definition in section B - 
“guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other 
places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for which the Personnel of Companies are required to 
carry or operate weapons in the performance of their duties.” 
25
  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
International Court of Justice Reports 1986, 62-4. 
26
  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
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Assuming that a state contracts with a PMSC to perform functions such as escorting 
aid convoys and, furthermore, agrees with the PMSC that force can be used to protect those 
convoys, when lethal force is used it could be argued that the PMSC is acting under the 
instructions of the state, making the state directly responsible for the ensuing deaths. The 
doubt about this argument is in the formulation of the control test, which requires that the 
state has to be in effective control of the actual act, conduct, or operation in question. This is 
a high threshold to cross.
27
 Although it may be argued that a contract for services should be 
construed as giving instructions to PMSCs, there could be doubt about whether those 
instructions were given in relation to the conduct or operation in question. Certainly in the 
Montreux Document, the participating states made it clear that, in their view at least, 
―entering into contractual relations does not itself engage‖ state responsibility; and that state 
responsibility would only be engaged if the PMSCs were part of the armed forces of the state, 
or were empowered to exercise governmental authority, or were ―in fact acting on the 
instructions of a State (i.e. the State has specifically instructed the private actor‘s conduct) or 
under its direction or control (i.e. actual exercise of effective control by the State over the 
private actor‘s conduct).‖28 The Draft Convention simply refers to the ILC‘s Articles on 
State Responsibility of 2001 in its preamble, and so could be said to have incorporated the 
rules on attribution (including Article 8 on private conduct). This all suggests that there has 
been no loosening of the rules on attribution of private conduct to a state, making it very 
difficult in reality to establish that a contracting state is directly responsible for the wrongful 
acts of PMSCs. Given that this seems to be the position for the contracting state, it is even 
less likely that the home state or the host state will be in effective control of the PMSC 
                                                                                                                                   
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), International Court of Justice Reports 2007, 43 at para. 406. 
27
  Ibid., para. 402. 
28
  Montreux Document, Part I.A., para.7. 
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conduct in question to allow for direct attribution of any wrongful conduct to those states.  
 
2.2 Institutional Responsibility 
Turning to an international organization‘s relationships with PMSCs, the latter could either 
be directly contracted with for services (for example, to provide humanitarian aid or even 
carry out peacekeeping functions) , or may come within a peacekeeping operation when 
attached to a country‘s military or civilian component. Peacekeeping operations are normally 
composed of contingents from troop- contributing nations (TCNs), and some of those TCNs 
may well be supported by PMSCs under governmental contract.
29
  
In these two different sets of circumstances attention should be paid to the ILC‘s 2011 
Draft Articles on Institutional Responsibility.
30
 In this document, the issue of attribution of 
the acts of private actors, is somewhat different from the rules on state responsibility. Those 
PMSCs directly contracted with by an organization could potentially fall under draft article 5, 
which considers that the conduct of an ―organ‖ or ―agent‖ of the organization in performance 
of its functions shall be an act of the organization. Draft article 2‘s definition of ―agent‖ was 
narrowed from earlier versions to mean ―an official or other person or entity, other than an 
organ, who is charged by the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its 
functions, and thus through whom the organization acts.‖ The tightening of the definition 
came after the UN Department of Legal Affairs expressed concern that, without the addition 
of a functional limitation, the ―definition of an agent could have been perceived as being so 
                                           
29
  For an overview of the UN’s engagement with PMSCs see A.G. Ostensen, “UN Use of Private Military and 
Security Companies: Practices and Policies,” DCAF, SSR Paper No. 3, 2011. 
30
  In ILC Report of the Work of its Sixty-Third Session, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011), 52.  
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broad as to expose us to unreasonable liability in respect of persons or entities over whom we 
have little or no control, and who do not carry out the functions of the UN, but rather provide 
goods and services which are incidental to our mandated tasks,‖specifically referring to 
contractors.
31
 This follows the UN‘s own internal law on contractors, which indicates that 
the UN does not view them as ―agents‖ of the organization.32 
In the case of PMSCs working for TCNs within a peacekeeping operation, once again 
the draft articles do not provide great clarity, even though they adopt, in draft article 7, an 
effective control of conduct test for state organs (which would cover national military 
contingents) placed at the disposal of international organizations. This would suggest that as 
an effective control test applies to regular troops, the same would apply to PMSCs. But again 
the issue has not been settled because practice indicates that the UN accepts responsibility for 
the conduct of peacekeepers even when it cannot be said to be in effective control.
33
 A looser 
form of control for multinational forces under UN mandate was - albeit controversially - 
accepted by the European Court of Human Rights in the Behrami case of 2007. In its 
decision, the Court imputed responsibility to the UN for the conduct of French troops in 
Kosovo on the basis that the UN retained ―ultimate authority and control‖ over the 
operation.
34
 Disputes in international legal doctrine about the nature of the control test for the 
attribution of acts of private actors are set to continue and reflect the failure of international 
law to keep pace with changes in the structure of states and organizations. 
                                           
31
  UN General Assembly, 66th Session, 18th Meeting of the Sixth Committee, October 24, 2011, Statement by 
Ms. Patricia O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs - 
http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/POB%20speech%20to%20the%20Sixth%20Committee%202011.
pdf (accessed on February 3, 2012).  
32
  UN’s General Conditions of Contract, Second Interim Revision, OLA Version, February 9, 2006, section 1, 
which states in part that a contractor “shall have the legal status of an independent contractor vis-à-vis the 
United Nations. The contractor’s personnel and sub-contractors shall not be considered in any respect as being 
the employees or agents of the United Nations.” 
33
  White, “Institutional Responsibility,” 388. 
34
  Behrami and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, (app. nos 71412/10 and 78166/01), para.133. 
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2.3 Acts of State and Organizations in a Post-modern World  
Thus - as with state responsibility, according to the ILC Draft Articles at least - attribution of 
the conduct of PMSCs to an organization requires a high threshold of control to be crossed.
35
 
Though there are doubts about the ―effective control of conduct‖ test for attribution to states 
and organizations,
36
 the majority view supports the effective control test and dismisses any 
deviation from it as wrong.
37
 However, as well as misrepresenting the way in which 
organizations exercise authority, the orthodox effective control test, as a depiction of acts of 
state, is inaccurate. The orthodox doctrine of international law - that conduct can constitute an 
act of state only if the state is in effective control of such conduct - arguably fails to 
understand how many post-modern states currently operate. In such a state, such as the UK, 
many functions that were traditionally performed by organs and employees of the state, such 
as running prisons, prisoner escort, and protection services, are outsourced to private 
companies. Furthermore, in such states, there may be greater outsourcing and privatization in 
some areas such as security, than in others, such as health or education. Different speeds of 
outsourcing are reflective of what is achievable politically and ideologically, rather than what 
is ethically acceptable. In areas in which outsourcing is deeply entrenched, and applying the 
orthodox test, the government is no longer in effective control of the conduct of private 
companies, and is therefore not responsible. The alternative view is that the government, in 
                                           
35
  Pierre Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations,” in The Law of State Responsibility, 
eds. James Crawford, Allain Pellet and Simon Olleson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 300-1. 
36
  Antonio Cassese, “The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in the Lights of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide,” European Journal of International Law 18 (2007): 665-67. See also White, “Institutional 
Responsibility,” 387-93. 
37
  Kjetil M. Larsen, “Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The Ultimate Authority and Control Test,” 
European Journal of International Law 19 (2008): 531: Marko Milanovic and Tatjana Papic, “As Bad as it 
Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’ Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law,” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Review 58 (2009): 267. 
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the words of the European Court in Behrami, retains ―ultimate authority and control‖ of these 
services, and should, therefore, accept responsibility. 
The prevailing orthodox view of state responsibility is very much based on the 
concept of a strong sovereign state, one that retains a firm grip if not monopoly on the use of 
force. Though such states clearly still exist, international legal doctrine has failed to adapt to 
the increasing variety of modern, post-modern, and also pre-modern states.
38
 In this vein, 
Neil Walker has cogently argued that within the European Union at least, a post-Westphalian 
phase of sovereignty - what he labels as ―late sovereignty‖ - has been reached. In this phase, 
sovereignty is ―no longer so widely or so confidently conceived of as part of the 
meta-language of explanation and political language‖; rather it is ―about a plausible and 
reasonably effective claim to ultimate authority‖ or a ―representation of authority made on 
behalf of a society which is (more or less successfully) constitutive of that society as a 
political society, or as a polity‖. Thus it should be possible to ―imagine ultimate authority, or 
sovereignty, in non-exclusive terms.‖39  
In relation to developing states in the context of colonialism and decolonization, 
Antony Anghie has argued that the ―acquisition of sovereignty by the Third World was an 
extraordinarily significant event; and yet, various limitations and disadvantages appeared to 
be somehow peculiarly connected with that sovereignty.‖40 Anghie‘s compelling thesis is 
that sovereignty in the Westphalian sense was not simply extended from European states to 
newly decolonized states; rather, colonialism helped to shape a new form of sovereignty for 
                                           
38
  See generally the contribution of Andrew Alexandra in this issue. 
39
  Neil Walker, “Late Sovereignty in the European Union,” in Sovereignty in Transition: Essays in European 
Law, ed. Neil Walker (Oxford: Hart, 2003), 18, 17, 23. 
40
  Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 2. 
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this new wave of independent states, one that is ―rendered  uniquely vulnerable and 
dependent by international law.‖41 Add to this Gerry Simpson‘s powerful analysis of the 
sovereign inequality that exists between great power states and ―outlaw‖ states.42 Thus 
current thinking about sovereignty indicates that it is not the construct upon which 
international relations is conducted, though unfortunately the repetition of the Westphalian 
concept of sovereignty in legal doctrine, signifies that its influence remains in core areas such 
as state responsibility. 
The notion of what is ―inherently governmental‖ has been hollowed-out by certain 
key states,
43
 rendering the orthodox test rarely applicable to them, though unsurprisingly 
those states continue to support such a test as it effectively allows them to outsource their 
responsibility as well as their functions. The same argument can be applied to an international 
organization such as the UN where the level of control of its operations involving state and 
non-state actors rarely reaches the threshold required by the orthodox test.  
Although it is possible to object morally to the reduction of a state‘s inherently 
governmental functions on the basis, for instance, that even a minimal state should provide 
security and not contract it out (as this may lead to some citizens, or areas, within a state, not 
being covered by security arrangements),
44
 the fact of governmental hollowing out has been 
clearly established in the case of the U.S.
45
 This has resulted in a reduction in democratic 
accountability (for example, little attention is paid in democracies to the loss of life of private 
military or security personnel, in contrast to loss of regular soldiers), and corresponds to an 
                                           
41
  Ibid., 6. 
42
  Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5. 
43
  See the contribution by Allison Stanger in this issue. 
44
  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 113. 
45
  Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of 
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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increase of corporate influence in government.
46
 Not conceding that the moral argument has 
been irrevocably lost, this article argues that even in such a weakened condition the state still 
has positive obligations to prevent human rights abuse by corporate actors it contracts with, 
or those which are based, or operating, within its jurisdiction. 
 
2.4 Corporate (Social) Responsibility 
It is unsurprising that just as international legal doctrine has failed to keep pace with the 
changing nature of sovereignty of the main actors (states), it has also failed to fully 
accommodate non-state actors within the subjects of the international legal order. 
International organizations are the exception in this regard, for though they are non-state 
actors, they are formed by states, and states often dominate their institutional structures. 
Nevertheless, the separate international legal personality of inter-governmental organizations 
has been grudgingly accepted by states.
47
 Individuals have acquired derivative rights under 
international human rights law, though the applicability and enforcement of those rights 
remain problematic. Furthermore, duties have been imposed on individuals under 
international criminal law.  
Corporations, despite the huge power and influence of multinational corporations 
especially in the era of economic globalization, are in many ways barely touched by 
international law at least directly in the form of binding treaty or customary obligations. The 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights‘s ―Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
                                           
46
  Ibid., ix. 
47
  See Jan Klabbers, “Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law,” in International 
Law and Legal Aspects of the European Union, ed. Martii Koskenniemi (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998), 243-49. 
 18 
 
 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights‖ of 2003 were 
ultimately rejected because they purported to impose obligations on corporations under 
international law. John Ruggie, then Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on 
business and human rights, dismissed the Norms‘ assertion of obligatory force to 
corporations as having ―little authoritative basis in international law - hard, soft or 
otherwise.‖48 Interestingly, there has been a more recent attempt to revive the possibility of 
legally binding corporations. An earlier version of the Draft Convention on PMSCs would 
have enabled corporations to have become parties to it, but the version that finally saw the 
light of day before the Human Rights Council in 2010 would be open only to states and 
organizations (a major breakthrough in itself if accepted) but not PMSCs.
49
 
This limitation is despite the fact that states and private companies have been 
intimately entwined since the days in which Hugo Grotius worked for the Dutch East India 
Company in the 17th century, a company that, along with the British East India Company, 
was responsible for establishing colonies on behalf of the state up until the end of the 19th 
century.
50
 The presence of private corporations at the heart of empire-building states seems 
to have been forgotten in the history of international law, which sees the 19th century as the 
period of absolute state domination.
51
 Antony Anghie writes that, ―examined in the context 
of colonial history,‖ the multinational corporations of the twenty-first century are ―in many 
respects successors to entities such as the Dutch and British East India Companies which, 
                                           
48
  Commission on Human Rights, “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Interim Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises,” UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006), para.60. 
49
  Draft Convention, Arts. 40-42. 
50
  Anghie, Imperialism, 141. 
51
  Reflected in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice as late as 1927 in The Case of the 
SS Lotus, Permanent Court of International Justice Series A, No.10 (1927) 18. 
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after all, had been central to the whole imperial project.‖52 Bearing in mind the global reach 
of companies such as G4S, with over half a million employees operating in 125 countries 
worldwide,
53
 the impact they have on states, especially weak or post-conflict states, is 
considerable. 
Although there appears to be no conceptual barrier to accepting corporations as 
having international legal personality and therefore being capable of having rights and duties, 
progress in establishing this has been limited.
54
 Instead, a softer form of regulation has 
emerged, labelled ―corporate social responsibility,‖ which can be found in initiatives such as 
the UN‘s Global Compact launched in 200055 and, more specifically, in the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers of 2010. John Ruggie has undertaken 
the conceptual and normative development of this form of responsibility.  
Ruggie‘s ―Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations ‗Protect, Respect and Remedy‘ Framework,‖56 endorsed by the UN‘s Human 
Rights Council in June 2011,
57
 represents the culmination of his work on this matter. 
Ruggie‘s Framework has three pillars. The first ―protect‖ pillar refers to the state‘s due 
diligence obligations under the international law discussed below, namely its ―duty to protect 
against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, through 
appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication.‖ The second pillar (the ―respect‖ pillar) 
                                           
52
  Ibid., 224. 
53
  http://www.g4s.com/en/Who%20we%20are/Where%20we%20operate (accessed February 3, 2012). 
54
  For a number of perspectives on this issue see Non-State Actors and Human Rights, ed. Philip Alson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), chaps. 5, 6, and 8. See also Sarah Joseph, “Taming the Leviathans: 
Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights,” Netherlands International Law Review 46 (1999): 171.  
55
  See also the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises” (rev. 2011; first produced in 1976). See also the International Labour Organization’s “Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy” (2006; first adopted in 1977).   
56
  UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, March 21, 2011 (hereinafter Ruggie’s “Framework” (2011)). 
57
  UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, June 16, 2011. 
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refers to CSR, that is, a corporation‘s own due diligence obligations arising from the 
expectation that responsible corporate actors ―should act with due diligence to avoid 
infringing the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved.‖ 
The third pillar (the ―remedy‖ pillar) is the ―need for greater access by victims to effective 
remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.‖58 Ruggie states that each pillar is an ―essential 
component in an inter-related and dynamic system of preventative and remedial measures: 
the State‘s duty to protect because it lies at the very core of the international human rights 
regime; the corporate responsibility to respect because it is the basic expectation society has 
of business in relation to human rights; and access to remedy because even the most 
concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.‖59  
Essentially Ruggie‘s ―Framework‖ works within the structures and strictures of 
international law
60
 as currently understood, by recognising that proper accountability for 
human rights abuse will work only if a regime of CSR is underpinned by states fulfilling their 
duties under international law. As Sorcha MacLeod observes, Ruggie‘s ―position is that only 
states are required to protect human rights while business actors are expected to respect 
human rights standards and to utilize due diligence in their commercial activities to ensure 
that the standards are observed.‖61 In effect, Ruggie‘s approach could be summed up in 
simple terms of state‘s being required to fulfil their due diligence obligations under human 
rights law to ensure that corporations within their jurisdiction, with whom they contract or 
otherwise control, operate with due diligence to avoid violating human rights and other 
applicable international laws. An elaboration of the different due diligence obligations of 
                                           
58
  Ruggie’s “Framework” (2011), para. 6. 
59
  Ibid. 
60
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states, organizations, and corporations will be provided below, before analyzing the 
Montreux Process and Draft Convention to see if they could provide the combination that 
Ruggie identifies.  
 
 
3 Due Diligence 
 
Given the weaknesses of international law in imposing direct responsibility on states, 
organizations, or corporations for the wrongful acts of individuals working for the latter, the 
specter is raised of a legal black hole in which PMSCs operate with impunity despite the 
existence of human rights law and international humanitarian law.
62
 The solution may take 
the form of due diligence, by which these actors have obligations to try to prevent 
misconduct. As Susan Marks and Fiorentina Azizi have written: ―especially in the context of 
human rights, it is often the State‘s failure to act - its failure to ensure protection, including 
protection against invasions of human rights by non-State actors - that is the problem.‖63 Due 
diligence obligations are of conduct rather than result, meaning that the actors in question 
have to ―deploy their best efforts to achieve a desired outcome (which might be to prevent a 
given event), even if that outcome need not be ensured.‖64 This gives the actors in question 
                                           
62
  See generally the contribution of Marcus Hedahl in this this issue. 
63
  Susan Marks and Fiorentina Azizi, “Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights Obligations: 
International Mechanism,” in International Responsibility, eds. Crawford, Pellet, and Olleson, 729. 
64
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certain latitude in how to fulfil these obligations. 
In the case of states, the different perspectives of home state (where the PMSC is 
based), host state (where the PMSC operates), and contracting state (which is purchasing 
PMSC services), need separate consideration.
65
 In general, much of Ruggie‘s first pillar (the 
protect pillar) is directed at the state‘s duty to ―prevent, investigate, punish and redress 
private actors‘ abuse.‖ Ruggie explains that though states ―generally have discretion in 
deciding upon these steps, they should consider the full range of permissible preventative and 
remedial measures, including policies, legislation, regulations, and adjudication.‖66 Thus, in 
discussing the positive obligations of different states, and later organizations and PMSCs, 
there is a fair degree of leeway in how due diligence should be implemented. 
 
3.1 Home States 
Developing the general principle of international law identified by the International Court of 
Justice in the Corfu Channel Case in 1949,
67
 the home state in which the PMSC is based 
should be responsible for knowingly allowing its territory to be used for unlawful acts against 
or in other states. Francesco Francioni cogently argues that the home state ―is in a good 
position to prevent human rights violations arising from the commercial export of security 
services because it is able to regulate the PMSC ‗at the source‘ by virtue of the effective 
control it exercises over the centre of management of the company.‖ This strongly supports 
                                           
65
  See Nigel D. White, “Regulatory Initiatives at the International Level,” in Multilevel Regulation of Private 
Military and Security Contractors, eds. Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (Oxford: Hart, 2012), 11-30. 
66
  Ruggie’s “Framework” (2011), commentary on Principle 1. 
67
  Corfu Channel Case (Merits), International Court of Justice Reports, 1949, 22.  
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the need for both a licensing and a monitoring system to be established by the home state.
68
   
Unfortunately, there are common misunderstandings concerning the obligations of the 
home state. Ruggie‘s statement that states are not ―required under international human rights 
law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction,‖69 misses the point that though the direct provisions of national human rights 
law and criminal law may not apply extraterritorially (depending upon a particular state‘s 
approach to jurisdiction), this does not absolve the state from ensuring, within its territory and 
jurisdiction, that corporate actors fulfil their human rights obligations. This could be achieved 
through proper training, impact assessment, and so forth. Thus although it is accurate to say 
that states have no obligation under international law to apply and enforce their laws 
extraterritorially (unless they exercise control over another state‘s territory or citizens), they 
still have due diligence obligations within their own jurisdictions to ensure that corporations 
based there (including ones such as PMSCs that operate overseas), are human rights 
compliant.  
 
3.2 Host States 
In international human rights law, cases such as the Velasquez Rodriguez case before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and subsequent ones developed by other 
human rights institutions
70
 have confirmed that the host state, in which private actors 
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operate, has an obligation to exercise due diligence to protect anyone within its jurisdiction 
from human rights abuse, whether committed by state agents or private actors. As the 
IACtHR has stated, ―an illegal act which violates human rights and which is  … not directly 
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the 
person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the 
State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the 
violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.‖71 Undoubtedly, many host states 
will be in a weak conflict or post-conflict condition, but they must not turn a blind eye to 
human rights abuses by private actors within their territory, and therefore must try to bring 
the perpetrators to justice with the resources available to them. In addition, Ruggie suggests 
that where the host state is weak and unable adequately to protect human rights, the home 
state of any transnational corporation involved should also endeavour to ensure that the 
corporation is not involved in human rights abuse.
72
  
 
3.3 Contracting States 
In addition to the possibility of directly imputable conduct discussed above, contracting states 
also have due diligence obligations. Ethically, it is due to the positive act of contracting for 
services with PMSCs that leads to wrongful acts being committed by their operatives; thus 
contracting governments should arguably bear responsibility above the home state, and 
certainly above the host state. Ruggie strongly argues that ―states do not relinquish their 
international human rights law obligations when they privatize the delivery of services that 
                                                                                                                                   
Francioni and Ronzitti, 130. 
71
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72
  Ruggie’s “Framework” (2011) commentary on Principle 7. 
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may impact upon the enjoyment of human rights.‖73 His ―Framework‖ lays down two 
principles that support this. Principle 5 declares that states ―should exercise adequate 
oversight in order to meet their international human rights obligations when they contract 
with … business enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the enjoyment of 
human rights‖; and Principle 6 declares that ―states should promote respect for human rights 
by business enterprises with which they conduct commercial transactions.‖74  
There is jurisprudence from the various international and regional human rights 
systems to support the application of due diligence obligations to contracting states.
75
 If a 
state is going to contract with a PMSC to help its troops in a foreign country, it should be 
prepared to ensure to the best of its ability that those contractors do not commit human rights 
abuses in that country. It is argued that due diligence obligations are necessary particularly 
when the contracting state does not itself assert effective national jurisdiction over such 
actors, beyond the enforcement of its contractual rights. This obligation would be 
strengthened further when the contracting state knows that the host state has a weak judicial 
system and enforcement mechanisms. Given that it is the contracting state that is responsible 
for the presence of PMSCs on the territory of another state, it would be incongruous for it not 
to have due diligence obligations when both the home and host state do. It might be argued 
further that, before it contracts with a PMSC for services to be rendered in the host state, the 
contracting state has a duty to ensure that the host state has satisfactory laws, courts, and 
enforcement mechanisms for holding PMSCs to account for human rights abuse if it is not 
prepared to assert jurisdiction over them itself. If such criteria are not met then the state 
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should not contract with the PMSC in question. In this way it is contended that a contracting 
state has a positive obligation to undertake a human rights impact assessment of its decision 
to contract services to PMSCs or, alternatively, it has to have in place processes that give it 
confidence that the PMSC itself will undertake its own full impact assessment.  
 
3.4 International Organizations 
As an international legal person, bearing rights and duties under international law,
76
 an 
international organization such as the UN or EU - that either contracts with a PMSC for the 
delivery of services, or mandates and commands a peacekeeping force consisting of TCNs 
with PMSC support - cannot deny that it owes due diligence obligations under customary 
international law to ensure that the private actors it has contracted with or mandated either 
directly or indirectly do not violate human rights or international humanitarian laws. For 
example, the UN could achieve this through its own accountability mechanisms such as the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in relation to directly contracted PMSCs;
77
 or 
through its agreements with TCNs; or through the UN Secretary General as commander of 
peacekeeping forces in relation to PMSCs working within UN mandated and commanded 
peace operations.  
 
3.5 PMSCs 
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  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, International Court of Justice Reports 
1949, 179. 
77
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Although the due diligence obligations of states and organizations are binding customary 
obligations in international law, because corporations are not subjects of international law, 
any due diligence commitments they may have are non-binding outcomes of exercises in 
CSR. Although they are not subject to direct obligations under international law, corporations 
will be governed by national laws adopted by states in fulfilment of their human rights 
obligations to ensure that private actors within their jurisdictions do not violate human rights 
law. In this sense corporations would be wise, and would be expected, to respect human 
rights. This sense of CSR is the one used in Ruggie‘s ―Framework‖, for instance in Principle 
11, which states that ―business enterprises should respect human rights,‖ meaning that ―they 
should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human 
rights impacts with which they are involved.‖78 According to Ruggie, the relevant human 
rights standards are to be found in the Universal Declaration, the International Covenants and 
eight core ILO Conventions.
79
 As explained above, although these standards are not binding 
directly on corporations under international law, such actors are expected to comply if they 
want to avoid adverse publicity and reputational consequences, as well as government action 
against them under applicable national laws.  
The nature of corporate due diligence is illustrated by the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers of 2010. In subscribing to the International 
Code companies recognize that they must act ―with due diligence to avoid infringing the 
rights of others.‖80 More specifically on this requirement, the International Code provides 
that signatory PMSCs will ―exercise due diligence to ensure compliance with the law and 
with the principles contained in this Code, and will respect the human rights of persons they 
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come into contact with, including, the rights to freedom of expression, association, and 
peaceful assembly, and against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy or deprivation 
of property.‖.81 The due diligence requirement emphasized in the code of conduct is not by 
itself a binding obligation on PMSCs
82
 - this is in contrast to the due diligence obligations 
placed on states and organizations by international law. This significant limitation is made 
clear in the International Code of Conduct when it states that it ―creates no legal obligations 
on the Signatory Companies, beyond those which already exists under national or 
international law. Nothing in this Code shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any 
way existing or developing rules of international law.‖83 In a way this is akin to the 
Montreux Document, which is not a binding treaty and creates no new obligations on states. 
However, unlike the International Code of Conduct, the Montreux Document is based on an 
understanding of existing international legal obligations on states,
84
 whereas there are no 
such underpinning obligations on corporations in international law. 
Nevertheless, Ruggie‘s ―Framework‖ of 2011 contains a number of principles that help to 
flesh out the components of a corporate human rights due diligence process, which ―should 
include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the 
findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.‖85 More 
specifically, according to Ruggie, corporate due diligence should cover human rights impacts 
caused by businesses through their activities or directly caused by their operations. In 
addition: 
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 it should be an ongoing process that varies with the size and type of business;  
 it should draw on internal and external human rights expertise and should involve 
meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups;  
 it should involve the effective implementation of the findings of any human rights 
impact assessment by assigning responsibility within the business but also by ensuring 
that decision-making and oversight mechanisms are designed to respond to such 
impacts; 
 it should include proper verification that human rights impacts are being addressed by 
businesses in tracking the effectiveness of their responses to impacts on individuals 
and groups, which can be done by obtaining feedback and by using indicators, surveys, 
and audits; 
 and, finally, it should include effective communication by corporations of how they 
address human rights impacts - meetings, online dialogues, consultation, and formal 
reports are all suggested.
86
 
Although responsible corporations are expected to fulfil these requirements, states are 
required by their positive obligations in international law to ensure their fulfilment. In these 
terms this binary form of responsibility - corporate social responsibility and state 
responsibility - has certain structural weakness arising out its dependency upon states having 
the primary legal obligation to ensure corporations act responsibly. This premise means that 
if a state is weak, or simply fails to recognize its obligations, the framework is undermined 
unless there is a mechanism at the international level that could help ensure that states take 
                                           
86
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action to ensure that PMSCs do not violate human rights. With that in mind, this analysis 
turns to the current international regulatory initiatives.    
 
 
4. The Montreux Process 
 
This section contains an examination of the provisions of the Montreux Document and the 
International Code of Conduct (together forming the Montreux Process) to see how they 
address issues of responsibility, especially in furthering the due diligence obligations outlined 
above. The article will then turn to see how the Draft Convention would work if it came into 
force within the context of the existing Montreux Process. 
In many ways, and despite leading analysis to the contrary,
87
 the Montreux 
Document of 2008 is quite strong on due diligence content in the form of identifying 
obligations and good practices for states. In its first part, the document affirms the legal 
obligations, including ones of due diligence, under international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law of home states, host states, and contracting states.
88
 In 
addition to identifying ―hard‖ laws binding under custom or treaty, the Montreux Document 
also lists ―soft standards‖ in the form of 73 ―good practices.‖ These good practices are 
detailed in the document‘s second part, and this list may lay the foundations for the regulation 
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of PMSCs through contracts, codes of conduct, national legislation, regional instruments and 
international standards.
89
 In many ways the second part of the Montreux Document provides 
flesh to the due diligence bones of the first part, but its formulation in the form of ―good 
practices‖ could be seen as recognition of the fact that due diligence standards may vary from 
state to state depending on their relationship to PMSCs.  
What the Montreux Document does make clear in the first part is that all three types 
of states - home, host, and contracting - owe due diligence obligations to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law by PMSCs and to give effect to their human rights obligations 
by taking appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, and provide effective remedies for 
PMSC conduct.
90
 Part Two then provides some detail of how these might be honored by 
states and here there is some variation, as expected, between the different types of state 
(though there is a large element of overlap in matters such as training). For contracting states, 
as well as indicating the procedures and criteria for selection of contractors, there is the 
expectation that the contract will include clauses and performance requirements to ensure 
respect for humanitarian and human rights law, and a stipulation that lowest price should not 
be the only criterion for selection.
91
 For host and home states, good practice would require 
them to authorize PMSCs operating or based on their territories, by having systems of 
licences, to be granted only after vetting of PMSCs as regards their policy statements, track 
records, monitoring and accountability systems, and training provision.
92
 
Although it can readily be construed as a significant contribution to recognizing the 
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due diligence obligations of states, the Montreux Document has several weaknesses. First, it 
is not by itself obligatory for states. Though it invokes a mixture of hard and soft 
international law applicable to states, the Montreux Document itself is not in the form of a 
treaty and, as recognized in its preface, is therefore ―not a legally binding instrument and so 
does not affect existing obligations of States under customary international law or under 
international agreements to which they are parties.‖93 Second, it is directed at states. The 
international law obligations identified and good practices proposed in the Montreux 
Document are mainly applicable to states, and, although PMSCs and their personnel do not 
completely escape from those provisions,
94
 the document does not attempt to regulate the 
industry. Rather, it serves to remind states of their obligations when engaging PMSCs or 
allowing them to operate from or in their territories. Third, though human rights obligations 
are included, the focus of the Montreux Document is on the application of  international 
humanitarian law to PMSCs in situations of armed conflict, when it is arguably more likely 
that PMSCs will be more readily deployed to post-conflict situations in which international 
human rights law is applicable.   
Although the Montreux Document encourages national monitoring and supervision by 
home, host, and contracting states (including through licensing and accountability 
mechanisms), it does not itself establish any international mechanism for regulation of  the 
due diligence obligations of either states or PMSCs. The Montreux Process has led to the 
development of the International Code of Conduct of 2010, which is premised on the creation 
of an oversight mechanism for corporations, but not for states, and thus may remedy the 
second of the weaknesses listed above.     
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The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers builds on 
the Montreux Document although the latter was directed at states. The Code of Conduct is 
directed at businesses, and is essentially an exercise in CSR as reflected in the preamble 
which refers to the ―Protect, Respect, and Remedy‖ human rights framework for business 
developed by Ruggie. As explained earlier, in subscribing to the Code of Conduct companies 
recognize that they must act with due diligence.
95
 More generally, in signing the code, 
PMSCs ―commit to the responsible provision of Security Services so as to support the rule of 
law, respect the human rights of all persons, and protect the interests of their clients.‖96 
The purpose here is not to go through all the Code of Conduct‘s provisions and 
consider whether they completely fulfil the due diligence requirements identified earlier. In a 
sense that is not possible, given that due diligence is not by any means a precise science, but 
the indications are that the code has strengths in CSR terms. On applicable human rights 
standards, the code does have well-developed and quite specific rules on the use of force, and 
on detention, as well as the following prohibitions: 
 on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;  
 on sexual abuse and gender based violence; 
 on human trafficking;  
 on slavery and forced labor;  
 on child labor;  
 and on discrimination.97 
All of these deepen the Code of Conduct‘s human rights coverage. Arguably, though, 
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the code should have covered all human rights standards, or at least those most applicable to 
PMSCs. The absence of any economic, social, or cultural rights is of concern because, for 
instance, the activities of a PMSC may well impact on cultural rights. The preamble to the 
Code of Conduct identifies the importance of PMSCs ―respecting the various cultures 
encountered in their work,‖98 but does not develop due diligence standards in this regard. 
The code is explicitly stated to be the beginning of a process, the ―founding instrument,‖ that 
will be built-on by the development of ―objective and measurable standards for providing 
security services.‖99 In developing standards for assessing human rights impact, cultural 
rights could and should be included. 
The Code of Conduct requires signatory companies to exercise due diligence in the 
selection of personnel, which will include checks on the criminal and military records of 
individuals as well as reviewing their fitness to carry weapons.
100
 Due diligence extends to 
the selection, vetting, and on-going review of subcontractors, in relation to which the PMSC 
undertakes to take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that subcontractors select, vet, 
and train their personnel in accordance with the requirements of the code.
101
 Signatory 
companies also agree on the training of personnel in ―all applicable international and relevant 
national laws, including those pertaining to international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law and other relevant criminal law.‖102 Although 
there are also requirements for reporting of incidents of abuse,
103
 there is little on PMSCs 
undertaking a proper assessment of their likely human rights impact, except for a very 
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general statement that signatory companies ―take steps to establish and maintain an effective 
internal governance framework in order to deter, monitor, report, and effectively address 
adverse impacts on human rights.‖104 Thus not all the due diligence obligations of 
corporations identified above in section 3.5 and contained in Ruggie‘s ―Framework‖ are 
covered in the code. 
In addition to management and training requirements, signatory companies agree to 
establish grievance procedures to address claims alleging failure to respect the principles 
contained in the Code of Conduct. Such procedures must be ―fair, accessible and offer 
effective remedies.‖105 However, the creation of what is essentially a non-binding set of 
standards, one that businesses can choose to sign up to, can be labelled only as a means of 
self-regulation. All remedies will be at the whim of businesses, unless there is some form of 
supervision of the Code of Conduct, either by an oversight body set up within the code itself 
or by states in fulfilment of their obligations under international law (a number of which are 
identified in the Montreux Document). Preferably, it would be both. Furthermore, in order to 
ensure that states fulfil their due diligence obligations, another level of supervision is required 
at the international level, established by states for states. Before looking at the proposal for 
this in the Draft Convention, we must first consider the oversight mechanism for the industry 
as envisaged in the Code of Conduct. 
The code, as originally adopted in 2010, is surprisingly light on regulation, though in 
the preamble an ―independent governance and oversight mechanism‖ is envisaged, and a 
Steering Committee - consisting of a small group of stakeholders drawn from the industry, 
states (the U.S. and UK), and civil society - was established to develop such an oversight 
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mechanism by November 2011.
106
 The Steering Committee produced a Draft Charter for the 
oversight mechanism in January 2012
107
 that envisaged a 12-strong executive board with 
equal numbers of members from industry, civil society, and states participating in the 
Montreux Process. This body would have competence over the oversight process to be 
operated by a secretariat including a Chief of Performance Assessment (CPA). The CPA 
would have oversight over participating companies, including instances when a PMSC has 
committed a serious violation of the Code of Conduct. In such a case, the CPA would have 
responsibility for the development of a remediation plan. In-field as well as remote oversight 
and monitoring of PMSC compliance is envisaged. Sanctions for non-compliance are limited 
to suspension and expulsion by the board following a report from the CPA.
108
 The strengths 
and weaknesses of the Draft Charter are readily apparent, especially the danger of the board 
being dominated by a small section of states and industry representatives. Furthermore, the 
sanctions at its disposal have not been proven to be effective in other codes of conduct. 
Nevertheless, the operation of the Draft Charter, assuming it comes into force, will determine 
whether it is a robust mechanism of oversight and accountability, or more of a symbolic form 
of CSR. 
 
 
5.  The Draft Convention 
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If the development of an regulatory regime for PMSCs were to stop at the Montreux 
Document and the International Code of Conduct, then, no matter how robust the CSR 
element, the state responsibility (SR) element would be inadequate, relying purely on states 
taking their due diligence obligations seriously. The current very limited regulatory regime 
put in place in the UK, for example, where a large number of PMSCs are based, does not 
suggest that this will happen without some form of international regulation of states.
109
  
Although the Draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies is a long 
way from seeing the light of day as a binding international treaty, this section contains an 
overview of some of its provisions in order to see how they address issues of responsibility 
and accountability. The Draft Convention was put forward by the UN Working Group on 
Mercenaries to the Human Rights Council in July 2010. The Draft Convention itself 
recognizes the value of codes of conduct, but declares that these are by themselves not 
enough.
110
 The rationale for some form of treaty regime is clear— - that without proper 
supervision of states‘ positive obligations at the international level, there will not be a robust 
framework within which PMSCs will act in accordance with their due diligence obligations. 
In general, the Draft Convention is restrictive on the types of activities that can be 
carried out by PMSCs. State responsibility is engaged if PMSCs undertake functions that 
would either be inherently governmental,
111
 or if they perform legitimately outsourced 
activities that violate the standards of international human rights law or international 
humanitarian law.
112
 State responsibility is established for ―military and security activities of 
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PMSCs registered or operating in their jurisdiction, whether or not these entities are 
contracted by the state.‖ In addition to establishing the obligations of home and host state, the 
Draft Convention requires contracting states to ―ensure that the PMSCs it has contracted are 
trained in and respect human rights and international humanitarian law.‖113 Furthermore, it is 
clear from the formulation of many of the provisions that the form of state responsibility 
envisaged is largely for failure to exercise due diligence over the actual or potential conduct 
of private actors within the jurisdiction of states (and organizations) parties to the 
convention.
114
 State parties are required to take such ―legislative, administrative and other 
measures as may be necessary to ensure that PMSCs and their personnel are held accountable 
for violations of applicable national or international law.‖115 Crucially, the Draft Convention 
requires that each state party ―ensure that PMSCs and their personnel apply due diligence to 
ensure that their activities do not contribute directly or indirectly to violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law.‖116 
The Draft Convention provides a number of techniques for state parties to fulfil their 
positive obligations to ensure that PMSC operate with due diligence. Basically, these involve 
the criminalization of certain activities, on the one hand, and the regulation of PMSC 
activities, on the other. With respect to the former, each state party is required to create 
national laws prohibiting acts carried out by PMSCs that are in furtherance of inherently state 
functions or that violate either international standards (under international human rights law, 
international criminal law, and international humanitarian law), or other provisions of the 
Draft Convention (such as those limiting the use of firearms). Furthermore, according to the 
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Draft Convention, unlicensed or unauthorized PMSC activities should also be made an 
offense under national law.
117
 
As well as mandating that states create legislation that can lead to punishment, the 
Draft Convention requires that state parties regulate the activities of PMSCs by adopting and 
implementing oversight laws.
118
  
The Draft Convention would require state parties to ―establish a comprehensive 
domestic regime of regulation and oversight over the activities in its territory of PMSCs and 
their personnel including all foreign personnel, in order to prohibit and investigate illegal 
activities as defined by this Convention as well as by relevant national laws.‖ To facilitate 
this, state parties are required to establish a register and/or a governmental body to act as a 
national center for information concerning possible violations of national and international 
law by PMSCs. State parties shall investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights norms by PMSCs, and ensure prosecution and 
punishment of offenders, as well as revoke licences given under the national licensing system 
required by the Draft Convention.
119
 
The Draft Convention envisages national licensing regimes,
120
 that should cover 
trafficking in firearms,
121
 as well as the import and export of military and security 
services,
122
 but there is little detail in the convention on whether licenses should be general 
to companies or specific to individual contracts. In addition, although the implementation of 
due diligence obligations allows states some choice, it may be necessary in any final 
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version—in order to avoid the development of vastly different national licensing regimes and 
consequent problems of forum shopping—to specify some minimal conditions that rule out 
the possibility of a company being granted an open-ended and unsupervised license.
123
 Such 
conditions could be developed in the jurisprudence of the Convention‘s Oversight Committee 
(discussed below), which is required to be kept informed about licensing regimes by those 
parties that import or export PMSC services.
124
 The requirements that state parties have a 
register of PMSCs operating within their jurisdiction, that they establish a governmental body 
responsible for the register‘s maintenance, and that they exercise oversight over PMSC 
activities,
125
 are equally lacking in detail and again could lead to a very weak system of 
registration and licensing.  
Supervision of the positive obligations of state parties would fall to the proposed 
Committee on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security 
Activities (Oversight Committee), consisting of international experts.
126
 This committee 
would receive reports from state parties on the legislative, judicial, administrative, and other 
measures they have adopted to give effect to the Draft Convention, and the committee would 
make observations and recommendations thereon.
127
 There are two further proposed methods 
of supervision and accountability by the Oversight Committee - an inquiry procedure and a 
conciliation process.
128
 Having a range of potential avenues for resolving disputes and claims 
may help to ensure that accountability is possible even in the most sensitive of situations. 
Unfortunately, however, the focus of the inquiry and conciliation processes seems to be 
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solely on states, and not on the victims of violations.
129
  
Having said that, in addition to a state complaints procedure
130
 - which, if other 
human rights treaties are any guide, is unlikely to be used - the Draft Convention contains an 
individual and group petition procedure into which state parties may opt. Individuals or 
groups claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the duties contained in the Convention 
(by those state parties opting into the process) may bring a petition. This envisages 
complaints being brought against states for their failure to regulate and control PMSCs in 
fulfilment of their positive obligations under by the Draft Convention.  
The lack of direct forms of redress against PMSCs in the convention is remedied by 
the requirement that each party implements domestic legislation giving effect to the Draft 
Convention, thus giving complainants local remedies that must be exhausted before a petition 
is submitted to the Oversight Committee.
131
 After considering petitions, the Oversight 
Committee shall forward its suggestions and recommendations, if any, to the state party 
concerned and to the petitioner.
132
 Though the remedy seems weak, this is standard in this 
type of procedure, and, given the evidence from the various UN human rights committees, it 
can be successful if the Oversight Committee performs its tasks with impartiality and bases it 
decisions on accepted interpretations of international law. If the Oversight Committee 
manages to establish its legitimacy, its decisions will generally be accepted by state parties. It 
will then be the job of the governments of state parties to enforce these decisions against 
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PMSCs based in or operating on their territory, or employed by them.
133
 
 
 
6.  Right To An Effective Remedy 
 
The dual combination of state responsibility and corporate social responsibility outlined 
above would facilitate the provision of remedial mechanisms and therefore facilitate access to 
justice for individuals. Such a view is supported by Ruggie‘s ―Framework‖ in the ―Remedy‖ 
pillar. The principles contained in that document require that states provide those affected by 
business-related human rights abuse within their jurisdictions with effective remedies. These 
should include ―apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation 
and punitive sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fines), as well as the 
prevention of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.‖ 
Remedial avenues should take the form of both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms and for 
a - ―courts (for both criminal and civil action), labor tribunals, National Human Rights 
Institutions, National [OECD] Contact Points, … ombudsperson offices, and 
Government-run complaints offices.‖134 In addition to these burdens placed on states in 
fulfilment of their due diligence obligations, Ruggie also includes ―operational-level 
grievance mechanisms‖ provided by corporations that are ―accessible directly to individuals 
                                           
133
  White, “Regulatory Initiatives”. 
134
  Ruggie’s “Framework” (2011), Principle 25 and commentary. 
 43 
 
 
and communities who may be adversely impacted by a business enterprise.‖135  
The presence of fair and effective remedies available from PMSCs for human rights 
abuses would reduce the need for victims to go through state procedures and, ultimately, to 
resort to the international level. The Draft Charter for an oversight mechanism for the 
International Code of Conduct put forward for consultation by the Steering Committee in 
January 2012 does give some positive indications by providing for supervision of the 
obligations in the Code of Conduct that all participating PMSCs have internal grievance 
procedures, and by allowing for individuals to bring complaints to the oversight mechanism 
alleging violations of the code.
136
 However, the Draft Charter‘s provisions are obscurely 
worded and seem to provide a great deal of leeway for PMSCs. In particular, the provisions 
present them with a chance, in the face of a complaint against them, to conduct an internal 
investigation and put forward proposals for remediation. Even more worryingly, it also 
allows the oversight mechanism itself to reject not only frivolous complaints, but complaints 
that are too challenging due to the ―difficulties in establishing facts in the context of activities 
that take place in complex environments.‖137 A reluctance to consider, let alone investigate, 
complex cases, is not encouraging evidence of the type of CSR remedial mechanism 
envisaged by Ruggie. 
The Draft Convention, on the other hand, does in general oblige states to provide the 
sort of remedies and access to them required by the ―Protect, Respect and Remedy‖ 
framework, and furthermore provides oversight and remedial processes at the international 
level. As outlined above, the Draft Convention generally envisages that such remedies will be 
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found in the national systems of the contracting parties, with the Oversight Committee 
ensuring this through state reports and, where applicable, by allowing individual petitions. 
However, just looking at the international level, it is doubtful whether envisaging a right of 
individual petition to the Oversight Committee represents an ―effective remedy.‖ The Draft 
Convention‘s protection of the individual victim at the international level is premised on the 
traditional paradigm of gaining the consent of states to an optional petition procedure, which 
is a supplement to remedies that the victim should gain (if the Draft Convention is in force 
for the state in question) before national courts and mechanisms. As it is, there is a 
recognition in the Draft Convention that a further remedial mechanism may be required at the 
international level, but it takes the form of a weak provision that requires states to ―consider 
establishing an International Fund to be administered by the Secretary General to provide 
reparation to victims of offences under this Convention and/or assist in their 
rehabilitation.‖138 
  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this article has shown that the Montreux Process and the Draft Convention 
(assuming the latter comes into being and enters into force) could either be rival or 
complementary regimes for the regulation of PMSCs. If rivals - each attracting a different set 
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of stakeholders (states and non-state actors)
139
 - it can be predicted that the Montreux 
Process will enhance the CSR of PMSCs, whereas the Draft Convention will harden the SR 
of states (and the institutional responsibility of organizations). However, it is only if they 
emerge as complementary regimes, with the majority of the same states signing up for both, 
that the CSR regime of the Montreux Process can be made more effective by the SR regime 
of the Draft Convention. By themselves, neither sufficiently encompasses both CSR and SR 
elements. More particularly, neither fully addresses the relationship between these elements, 
which is necessary for a legitimate and effective system of regulation that will deliver access 
to justice for victims of human rights abuse by PMSCs. Without a supervised treaty regime to 
ensure that states fulfil their due diligence obligations under SR, there can be no assurance 
that states will ensure that corporations fulfil their due diligence obligations under CSR.  
Until corporations are recognised as subjects of international law against which direct 
enforcement can be taken, any CSR regime for PMSCs, no matter how successful in its own 
terms, will not fully deliver justice and accountability for the simple reason that voluntary 
self-regulation (even with oversight) will primarily cover the good citizens of the corporate 
world and not the bad. Ensuring that states have strong national systems of accountability 
applicable to PMSCs, and providing international accountability mechanisms against states, 
is necessary to ensure that states fulfil these obligations. But, of course, this ultimately comes 
up against the weaknesses in all international regulation - that even though treaties provide 
for binding commitments for states, it is a decision of each state whether to become a party. 
Little can be done to change this given that a mandatory legislative decision of the UN 
Security Council on this matter is very unlikely and, in any case, is a hugely problematic way 
of making legitimate international law.    
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There is a great deal of work to be done, both to persuade those states that are behind 
the Montreux Process that an international treaty along the lines of a Draft Convention is 
necessary (and the recent meeting of the open- ended intergovernmental working group 
established by the Human Rights Council in 2010 shows how difficult this is going to be),
140
 
and to make the provisions of the Montreux Process and the Draft Convention compatible - 
for instance, in achieving clarity (via compromise) on what can and cannot be outsourced to 
PMSCs. Rather than the current approach adopted in the Draft Convention of prohibiting the 
outsourcing of inherently governmental functions, a compromise would be to recognize that 
certain functions such as combat, arrest, detention, interrogation, and intelligence gathering, 
are acts of states no matter who performs them. They therefore give rise to state 
responsibility. Under this approach the outsourcing of state functions is permitted but the 
outsourcing of state responsibility is not. If this agreement can be achieved, further work will 
still be required to ensure that the Montreux Process and the Draft Convention provide clear 
and inter-locking due diligence obligations on all three actors - states, organizations, and 
PMSCs. One method of achieving this would be to bring the Draft Convention‘s due 
diligence obligations closer to the ―good practices‖ detailed in the second part of the 
Montreux Document. The overriding purpose of any such developments must be to provide 
comprehensive provision for effective access to justice, through judicial and non-judicial 
means, for victims of abuse at the hands of PMSCs at both national and international levels. 
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